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the capital stock as such could be taxed was repudiated. The
State can no more tax the capital stock of a foreign corpora-
tion than it can tax the capital of a foreign person. Pennsyl-
vania cannot tax a citizen and resident of New York, either for
the whole or any part of his general property or capital. It
can only tax such property of that citizen as may be located
and have a situs in Pennsylvania. 'And it is exactly the
same with a foreign corporation. Its capital, as such is not
taxable. 'To hold otherwise would lead to the most
oppressive and unjust proceedings. It would lead to a course
of spoilation and reprisals that would endanger the harmony
of the Union.
STATE TAXATION OF PROPERTY USED FOR PURPOSES OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The practical wisdom and political
foresight of the men who framed the
Constitution are nowhere, perhaps,
better illustrated than in the adoption"
of the Commerce Clause. The sub-
sequent experience of the country has
shown that the people of the several
States, from motives of pure self-
interest, are prone to foster their own
interests at the expense of the inter-
ests of their neighbors, and to
shift the burden of the support of
their several governments as much as
possible from their own shoulders to
those of the citizens of the other
States. But in attempting to acccom-
plish these ends the States have fre-
quently found themselves confronted
by the Commerce Clause of the Na-
tional Constitution, and the firm
stand which the Supreme Court has
always maintained in the construing
that clause has invariably frustrated
such selfish designs, and has con-
tributed not a little to the political
harmony and economic welfare of the
country.
In the great case of Brown v.
Mai,land, 12 Wh. 419, (1827), which,
with the somewhat earlier case
of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wh. i,
(1824), forms the foundation upon
which has been reared the whole
structure of Interstate Commerce
law, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking
of the taxing power of the State,
said: "We admit this power to be
sacred; but cannot admit that it may
be used so as to obstruct the free ex-
ercise of a power given to Congress.
We cannot admit that it may be used
so as to defeat the power to regulate
commerce. It has been observed
that the powers remaining with the
States may be so exercised as to come
in conflict with those vested in Con-
gress. When this happens that which
is not supreme must yield to that
which is supreme. This great and
universal truth is inseperable from
the nature of things, and the consti-
tution has applied it to the often in-
terfering powers of the general and
State governments as a vital principle
of perpetual operation. It results,
necessarily, that the taxing power of
the State must have some limits."
And Mr. Justice STRONG, in the
case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall.
282 (1871), says : "While upon
I Slate Tax on Foreign held Bonds, i5 Wall.
Gloucester Ferry Company v. Pe 'zsylvania, qua supOra,
FOR PURPOSES OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
the one hand it is of the utmost
importance that the States should
possess the power to raise reve-
nue for all purposes of a State
government, by any means, and in
any manner not inconsistent with the
powers which the people of the States
have conferred upon the general gov-
ernment, it is equally important that
the domain of the latter should be
preserved free from invasion, and
that no State legislation should be
sustained which defeats the avowed
purpose of the Federal Constitution,
or which assumes to regulate or con-
trol subjects committed by the Con-
stitution exclu'hively to the regulation
of Congress." And in 'l1ziladeliltia
S. S. Co. v. Penna., 122 U. S. 320,
(1886), Mr. Justice BRADLEY says:
"The result of all the cases is that
the corporate franchises, the pro-
perty, tile business, the income of
corporations may undoubtedly be
taxed by the State, but in impos-
ing such a tax, care should be
taken not to interfere with or hamper,
directly or by indirection, interstate
or foreign commerce, or any other
matter exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Government.
This is a principle so often announced
that it may be said to be an axiom of
our Constitutional jurisprudence.
The great majority of cases involv-
ing a consideration of tile limits which
the commerce clause imposes upon
the taxing powers of the States have
arisen out of attempts of the States to
lay taxes upon the business or occu-
pation of carrying on interstate com-
merce. With this line of cases, in the
present inquiry, we have nothing to
do. It is sufficient to say that the
invalidity of such taxes is now
almost universally recognized. Nor
need we concern ourselves with that
other large class of cases which deals
with State taxes upon the articles or
subjects of commerce in which an
interstate traffic is actually being
carried on, and which have not be-
come merged in the common mass of
property within the State. It may be
said of such taxes, also, that their
invalidity is now pretty generally con-
ceded. The present inquiry will
therefore be limited to a consideration
of the validity of State taxes upon
property not in itself a subject or
article of interstate commerce, but
employed as a means or instrumen-
tality for carrying on the same.
The earliest case on this subject is
that of Hays v. Pacific .ail S. S.
Co., How. 596 (1854). The plaintiff
was a New York corporation, and
operated a line of steamships between
New York and San Francisco. After
landing cargo and passengers at
San Francisco, the vessels usually
proceeded to another California
port, where they laid tip for a
week or so before starting on the
return voyage. The vessels were
registered at New York, where the
corporation had its principal office,
and where all the stockholders re-
sided. Under these circumstances,
the State of California levied a tax
upon the vessels as property within
the State. The Court held that the
State of California had no jurisdic-
tion over these vessels for the lr-
poses of taxation; they were not,
properly, abiding within its limits, so
as to become incorporated with the
other personal property of tie State;
they were there but temporarily,
engaged in lawful trade and com-
merce, with their silts fixed by
the Act ot Congress at their home
port, where they were required
to be registered, and where their
owners were liable to be taxed for the
capital invested, and where the taxes
had been paid. "Whether a vessel
leaving her home port for trade and
commerce, visits in the course of her
voyage several ports, or confines her
operations to one, are questions that
will depend upon the profitable re-
turns of the business, and will furnish
no more evidence that she has become
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a part of the personal property within
the State, and liable to taxation at
one port than at the others. She is
within the jurisdiction of all or any
one of them temporarily, and for a
purpose wholly excluding the idea of
permanently abiding in the State, or
changing her home port. Our mer-
chant vessels are not unfrequently
absent for years, in the foreign carry-
ing trade, seeking cargo, carrying
and unloading it from port to port,
during all the time absent; but they
neither lose their national character
nor their home port as inscribed upon
their stern. The distinction between
a vessel in her home port and when
lying in a foreign one, or injthe port
of another State, is familiar in the
admirality law. She is subjected, in
many cases, to the application of a
different set of principles." In other
words, the settled custom ofmaritime
nations has always been to consider
vessels as property whose silus is in
the country in which they they belong,
and in no sense as property of the
country to which they come on their
voyages, and the Act of Congress has
extended this principle as between the
several States, so that California had
no more jurisdiction to tax the vessels
in question than she would have had
had they belonged in a foreign country.
This case was followed in the
case of .5organ v. Parham. 16 Wall.,
471 (872), in which the facts were
substantially the same. The city
of Mobile assessed one of several
steamships plying between Mobile
and New Orleans, as personal pro-
perty of the plaintiff in the City of
Mobile, and levied a tax thereon. The
vessel was registered at New York,
where her owner resided. She was
also enrolled at Mobile. Speaking of
the effect of registry and enrollment
the Court says : " Permanent registry
is required to be made at the home
port, and the Act provides that the
name of the vessel and the port to
which she shall so belong shall be
printed on her stem. All persons,
therefore, have the means of ascer-
taining the name of the vessel and
her home port, and her shipping
papers, which include a copy of her
register or enrollment, are by law re-
quired to furnish the same informa-
tion.. The Act prescribes the terms
and shows the effect of enrollment at
another port. In substance the per-
manent register is given up to the
collector of that port, anda certificate
is issued showing the name of the
vessel, the port to which she belongs
and that to which she -is destined.
This certificate is temporary in its char-
acter, and is based upon the proposi-
tion that the vessel belongs or has her
home port, at a different place from
that at which she receives this certifi-
cate. There was nothing, therefore,
in her enrollment in the port of Mobile
that affected her registry in New York,
or her ownership in that place, or that
tended to subject her to taxation by
the State of Alabama, under the cir-
cumstances stated. In the opinion of
the Court the State of Alabama has
no jurisdiction over this vessel for the
purpose of taxation for the reason that
it had not become incorporated into
the personal property of that State,
but was there temporarily, only, and
that it was engaged in lawful com-
merce between the States with its
silus at the home port of New York,
where it belonged and where its
owner was liable to be taxed for its
value."
And to the same effect in St. Louis
v. The Wiggins Ferry Co., ix Wall.,
423 (1870). In Wheeling 7rans-
porlalion Co. v. Wheeling, 98 U. S.,
273 (1878), the question was raised
whether vessels engaged in inter-
state commerce could be taxed
as property by the State or municipal-
ity in which their home port was
situated and in which their owners
resided. The Court held that since
the vessels were property belonging
to the citizens of the State they were
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liable to taxation there in the same
manner as other property, and that
there was nothing in the National
constitution, or in the fact that the
vessels in question were licensed to
carry on the coasting trade which
would render such a tax be invalid.
There are many cases in which the
Courts in denying the power of the
States to lay duties of tonnage, have
admitted that the owners of ships may
be taxed to the extent of their interest
in the same, for the value of the pro-
perty. Assessments of the kind, when
levied for muncipal purposes, must be
made against the owner of the pro-
perty, and can only be made in the
municipality where the owner resides.
"Decided cases of the kind every-
where deny to the States the power
to tax ships as the instruments of
commerce, but they all admit, ex-
pressly or impliedly, that the State
may tax the owners of such property
for their interests in the same. Cor-
responding views are expressed by
Mr. Burroughs in his valuable treatise
upon taxation. He says that vessels
of all kinds are liable to taxation as
property in the same manner as other
personal property owned by the citi-
zens of the State; that the prohibition
only comes into play where they are
not taxed in the same way as the other
property of the citizens, or where the
tax is imposed upon the vessel as an
instrument of commerce without refer-
ence to the value as property." '1 his
case is authority, therefore, for the
proposition that property used for the
purposes of interstate commerce is
not, on that account, exempt from
taxation, which is otherwise proper.
The case of Wiggins Ferry Co. v.
E z.rt St. Louis, 1o7 U. S. 365,
(1882), carries this doctrine much
further. The city had passed an
ordinance requiring all persons and
corporations engaged in certain
businesses and professions to take
out licenses, and further provided
that "Keepers of Ferries shall pay
$ioo license for each boat plying be-
tween this city and the opposite bank
of the river for one year." Under
this ordinance the City brought an
action against the Wiggins Ferry Co.
a corporation of the State, operating
a ferry across the Mississippt, to re-
cover the license fee. The Court
held, Mr. Justice WOODS writing the
opinion, that the levying of a tax
upon vessels, or, the exaclion of as
license fee, by the State within which
the property subject to the exaction
has its situs, is not a regulation of
commerce within the meaning of the
Coustitution of the United States.
"The exaction of a license fee is an
ordinary exercise of the police power
by municipal corporations. Where,
therefore, a State expressly grants to
an incorporated City, as in this case,
the power to license, tax and regu-
late ferries, the latter may impose a
license tax on the keepers of the
ferries, although their boats ply be-
tween landings lying in two different
States, and the Act by which this
exaction is authorized will not be held
to be a regulation of commerce." It
may be said in passing, that in the
light of the more recent decisions it
may well be doubted whether the
doctrine thus broadly laid down
would be adhered to at the present
time, and whether, on a similar state
of facts, such a tax would now be
held valid. And it is to be observed
that the decision is confined to boats
used in operating a ferry, and there
has always been a tendency in the
cases to regard ferries as more appro-
priately under State control than
other branches of interstate com-
merce, for when the City of New Or-
leans required a similar license from
persons or corporations running boats
to or from the Gulf of Mexico, the
exaction was held invalid. Moran v.
ev Orleans, II2, U. S. 68. (1884).
Considerable stress is laid in the
majority opinion upon Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Penna., 114, U. S.
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196, (1884). The facts of that case
were as follows : The State of
Pennsylvania enacted a law pro-
viding that every corporation doing
business within the State should pay
a tax at a certain rate upon its capital
stock. The Gloucester Ferry Co.
was a New Jersey corporation, which
operated a line of ferry boats across
the Delaware River, between Phila-
delphia and Gloucester. The com-
pany leased a wharf within the former
city, but the boats were registered in
Camden. The State of Pennsylvania
claimed that leasing a wharf within
the State and landing and receiving
passengers at it was "doing busi-
ness" within the State, and that
therefore the whole capital stock was
liable to taxation in Pennsylvania.
The Court held that while corpora-
tions might be taxed in Pennsylvania
for the value of the wharf which it
leased there, it could not be taxed in
the manner above described, for as
Chief Justice MARSHALL said, "The
power of taxation, however vast in
its character and searching in its ex-
tent, is necessarily limited to subjects
within the jurisdiction of the State."
And the Court went on to say, quot-
ing from Pennsylvania v. Standard
Oil Company, roi Pa. 119, (I882),
that it had been repeatedly decided,
and was settled law, that a tax
upon the capital stock of a com-
pany is a tax upon its property
and assets. Since the company
was not domiciled in Pennsylvania,
and had none of its capital invested
there, the boats being registered in
New Jersey, it followed that the tax
was laid solely on account of the busi-
ness of the company in landing and
receiving passengers at the wharf in
Philadelphia, and that business was
an essential part of the transportation
between the States of Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, which is itself inter-
state commerce. "While it is con-
"ceded that the property in a State
"belonging to a foreign corporation
"engaged in foreign or interstate com-
"merce may be taxed equally with
"like property of a domestic corpor-
"ation engaged in that business, we
"are clear that a tax or other burden
"imposed on the property of either
"corporation because it is used to
"carry on that commerce, or upon the
"transportation of persons of property
or for the navigation of the public
"waters over which the transporta-
"tion is made, is invalid and void as
"an interference with and an obstruc-
"tion on the power of Congress in the
"regulation of.such commerce." And
the Court also held that the fact that
the company was engaged in operat-
ing a ferry could not authorize the
imposition, by the State, of taxes or
other burdens upon commerce be-
tween the States.
It will be seen that the tax in ques-
tion was held invalid because it was
in no sense a tax upon the property of
the corporation equally with the other
property within the State, inasmuch
as the property sought to be taxed
was never within the State, and the
case, accordingly, apart from the ex-
pressions that were used, has very
little bearing upon present inquiry.
The two cases of Brown v. Hous-
ton, 114 U. S., 922 (1884), and Coe v.
Errol, i6 U. S., 517 (1885). cited in
the majority opinion, dealt with State
taxation of the articles or subjects of
commerce. In the first case, a cargo
coal had been sent from Pittsburg to
agents in New Orleans, to be by them
sold. While laying at the wharf, and
before the agents had succeeded in
selling it, it was assessed as movable
property within the city belonging to
them, and they were compelled to pay
a tax thereon. The Supreme Court
upheld the tax, holding that the cargo
had become merged in the general
mass of property within the State.
And in the 'tase of Coe v. Errol, the
Court held that articles of commerce
were not exempt from local taxation
until they had actually started on
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their interstate journey. Nor was it
material that the goods in question
were owned by persons residing in
another State. "We take it to be a
point settled beyond all contradiction
or question, that a State has jurisdic-
tion of all persons and things within its
territory which do not belong to some
other jurisdiction, such as the repre-
sentatives of foreign governments,
with their houses and effects, and
property belonging to or in the use of
the governments of the United States.
"If the owner of personal property
within the State resides in another
State which taxes him for that pro-
perty as a part of his general estate
attached to his person, this action of
the latter State does not in the least
affect the right of the State in which
the property is situated to tax it also.
It is hardly necessary to cite author-
ities on a point so elementary." And,
though the point was not actually
before them, the Court cited with
approval the decision of the Court
below that goods merely passing
through a State, but detained there
temporarily by accident or stress of
weather, had no silus there for pur-
poses of taxation.
The case Pickard v. Pullnan Co.,
t17 U. S. 34, (188 5) is an import-
ant one in this connection. The
Legislature of Tennessee passed an
Act providing that "the running and
using of sleeping cars on railroads in
Tennessee, not owned by the railroad
upon which they were used, is de-
clared a privilege, and the companies
owning and running or using said
cars are required to pay $So a year
for each and every one of said cars
used or run over said roads." Under
this Act a tax was imposed upon the
Pullman Company for thirty-six cars
owned by them and used by various
railroads in Tennessee for the trans
portation of passengers, within, into,
odt of and through Tennessee. The
tax had been held invalid by Mr.
Justice Matthews, in the Circuit Court,
and the Supreme Court took the same
view. The Court pointed out that
the tax was not a property tax, be-
cause under the constitution of Ten-
nessee property could only be taxed
according to its value, and this tax
was an arbitrary charge. What was
done by the company was taxed as a
privilege. The tax was imposed as a
condition precedent to the right o
the company to run and use the cars
owned by it, as it ran and used them,
on railroads in Tennessee, and upon
principle the tax if lawful might have
been large enough to practically stop
altogether this particular species of
commerce. It was contended that the
business of the company was merely
to furnish extra accommodations or
comforts, and that a burden upon it
was not a burden upon interstate
commerce. But the Court held that
the tax was really one on the right of
transit, though laid wholly on the
owner of the car. So, too, the service
rendered to the passenger was a unit.
The car was as much a vehicle of
transit, as if it had been a car owned
by the railroad company, and the
special conveniences or comforts fur-
nished to the passengers had been
furnished by the railroad company
itself. "The fee paid by the inter-
state passenger to the railroad com-
pany, and that paid to the plaintiff'
added together, were merely a charge
for his conveyance in a particular way,
and there was really but one charge
for the transit, though the total
amount paid was divided amorg two
recipients. The service was a single
one, of interstate transit, with certain
accommodations for comfort, and what
was paid to the company was part of
a charge for the conveyance of the
passenger." The Court accordingly
held that the tax was virtually a tax
upon the interstate transportation of
passengers and therdfore void. The
results of this case may accordingly
be summed up by stating that it is
authority for the proposition that the
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State cannot levy an arbitrary charge,
at so much a car, upon companies
owning or using cars employed in
conducting interstate commerce.
The case of Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Allorwey-General of
Massachusetts, '123 U. S., 630 (1887).
forms a bone of contention between
the majority and the minority in
the principal case. Mr. Justice
BRADLEY, however. took no part
in that decision, not having heard
the argument. The tax in question
in that case was one imposed on the
proportion of capital stock supposed
to be invested in Massachusetts, tak-
ing as a basis of assessment such pro-
portion of the value of the entire
capital stock of the company as the
length of the company's lines within
the State bore to their entire length
throughout the country. The Court
said that the tax, though nominally
upon the capital stock of the company,
was in effect a tax upon that organiza-
tion on account of property owned
and used by it in the State of Massa-
chusetts. It was urged that the
method of assessment employed was
not an accurate one, and that the
property of the company situated in
Massachusetts had no necessary rela-
tion to the proportion of capital stock
taxed, because the aggregate value of
the stock might depend upon pro-
perty, franchises and business outside
of Massachusetts, largely out of pro-
portion to the telegraph lines outside
of that State. But the Court said:
"since this statute of Massachusetts
is intended to govern the taxation of
all corporations therein, and doing
business within its territory, whether
organized under its own laws or those
of some other State, and since the
principle is one which ve cannot pro-
nounce to be an unfair or an unjust
one, we do not feel called upon to
hold the tax void because we might
have adopted a different system had
we been called upon to accomplish the
same result." And the Court also
said that in their opinion, in view of
the importance of the business done
in Massachusetts, the method employ-
ed was anything but unfavorable to
the company.
It will be observed that the above
case, while it has several points of
similarity with the principal case,
has also some points of difference.
These are emphasized by Mr. Justice
BRADLEY in his dissenting opinion.
He says: "The same difficulty as to
the method of determining value ex-
ists in this case which existed in that;
but the more 5erious difficulty lies in
the question ofthe situs of the property,
and the consequent jurisdiction of the
State of Pennsylvania to tax it. It is
not fast property ; it does not consist
of real estate ; it does not attach itself
to the land; it is movable, and en-
gaged in interstate commerce, not in
Pennsylvania alone, but in that and
other States, and the question is, How
can such property be taxed by a State
to which it does not belong? It is indi-
rectly, but virtually taxing the passen-
gers. It is clearly a burden on inter-
state commerce." But passing, for
the moment, the difficult question of
situs, and assuming that the State of
Pennsylvania had jurisdiction, for the
purposes of taxation, of such cars,
then it would seem that 7Telegraph
Co., v. iMfassachuselts is conclusive of
the question whether such a tax is a
burden upon interstate commerce.
The tax upon the cars as property,
under a proper valuation, is no more
an indirect tax upon the passengers
carried than was the tax upon the
property of the telegraph company,
under a similar method of valuation,
a tax upon the messages sent. How-
ever much the fact that the cars are
movable, and are, in fact, moved from
State to State, may affect their situs
as to State taxation, it cannot affect.
the question as to whether such tax-
ation is a burden upon interstate
commerce.
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The case of Mary~e. v. B. 6- 0.
.R. 2. 127 U. S. 117, 0887), is suffi-
ciently stated by the Court in the
majority opinion. But Mr. Justice
Gray, in quoting from the opinion
of Mr. Justice Matthews in that
case, refers to it as "the unani-
mous judgment of the Court." But it
should be remembered that though it
is true no one dissented, yet the portion
of the opinion referred to was as pure a
dictum as is often found in the reports.
The Court had already decided that
the Statutes of Virginia imposing tax-
ation did not apply to the property in
question, and this of course disposed
of the case, for there was no longer
any law whose validity was to be
determined. What was said beyond
this was upon the authority only of
the writer of the opinion, and while
not questioning the accuracy of Mr.
Justice Matthews' reasoning in the
passage quoted, we simply call atten-
tion to the fact that it was not neces-
sary for the decision of the case, and
hence it cannot be inferred with cer-
tainty that all the other members of
the Court entertained the same ideas.
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Hay.
ward, 141 U. S. 36, (1891), a case
coming up from Kansas, was argued
at the same time as Pullman's Co.
v. Psnnsylvania and was said by
the Court to be governed by the
same principles. The tax differed
slightly from that in the Penn-
sylvania case, inasmuch as it was not
laid upon the company owning the cars
but upon the railroad companies that
used them. The tax was apportioned
among the various counties of the
State according to the railroad mileage
therein, and although it is not dis-
tinctly stated, and the statutes quoted
do not clearly require it, it is quite
probable that the tax was also appor-
tioned in like manner among the
various States in which the cars were
used. If this were not the method em-
ployed the case could not have fallen
within the principles of the first case.
This completes the list of cases on
this subject in the United States Su-
preme Court. There have been vari-
ous cases in the State and Circuit
Courts which have not gone up to that
tribunal for final decision. The case
of Pullman Company v; Twombly,
29 Fed. R. 658, in the U. S. Circuit
Court of Iowa, however, though
falling directly within Pullman Co. v.
Hay'ard, Supra, contains such a
clear statement of the law by Judge
Brewer, now a Justice of the Supreme
Court, and one of the majority in the
principal case, as to be worthy of
examination.
The State of Iowa taxed the railroad
companies within the State for all
sleeping and dining cars used, but
not owned by them, but only upon a
proportion of their value equal to the
proportion of their mileage within the
State. Judge Brewer remarked that in
the absence of any legislation by
Congress, similar to that in regard to
vessels, fixing the "home port" or
silus of personal property engaged in
interstate commerce, the most con-
venient rule must govern. This
was not the case of cars owned in
other States and only making single
trips to the State of Iowa, but of cars
which were found, andfound contin-
ously, in the State of Iowa, and which
consequtently acquired a situs there
for the laxation. If this were not so,
and the cars could only be taxed in
the domicile of the owner, then that
domicile might not be in any of the
States in which the cars were used-
might even be in a foreign country-
and yet each of these States would be
bound to afford the cars protection.
The conclusions of the learned Judge
were as follows:
(x) "That property is not exempt
from liability to an equal and uniform
tax, by the fact that it is used either
particularly or exclusively for inter-
state commerce. (2) That vehicles of
transportation used continuously upon
a single run, acquire a situs for pur-
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poses of taxation, independent and
irrespective of the domicile of the
owner. (3) Such silus is not destroyed
by the fact that the owner owning
many vehicles of like c.haracter, and
having lines in various parts of the
United States, transfers from time to
time, such vehicles from one line to
another, provided a continuous use of
such vehicles is preserved upon the
single run. (4) When such vehicles
are used upon arun extending through
two or more States, there is a situs
for taxation in each State, to a fair
proportion of the value of the property
so used."
The case of Pennsylvania v. Stand-
ard Oil Co. ior Pa. S. 1i9, (1882).
decided by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which we referred
to in commenting on Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. 1'ennsylvania, is a
similar case to the latter, but has not
as much bearing on this inquiry,
since there was no question of inter-
state commerce raised. The conten-
tion in that case was that the Stand-
ard Oil Co., an Ohio corporation,
which owned interests in certain cor-
porations and individual partnerships
in Pennsylvania, was doing business
within the State, and. under the
statutes, liable for a tax upon its
entire capital. The Court held that
except as to the interests in individual
partnerships, the corporation was not
doing business in Pennsylvania, and
that as to those it could only be taxed
upon a portion of its capital stock
equal to the value of those interests.
This was because, as settled by a large
number of cases, a tax upon the
capital stock of a corporation is a tax
upon its property and assetsand there-
fore the company was only taxable for
such portion of its property as was
actually within the State. It was con-
tended that by doing business within
State the company brought its entire
capital within the jurisdiction of Penn-
sylvania. But the Court said: "A
foreign corporation has no domicile
here, and can have none; hence it
cannot be said to draw to itself the
constructive possession of its prop-
erty located elsewhere."
It is not often we find a State Court
going farther than, or even as far as,
the Supreme Court in restricting the
powers of the State, but in the case of
Bain v. Richmond 6' Danville RR.
Co., 31 I. C. R., 149 (i8go), the
Supreme Court of North Carolina
took a more advanced stand than
even the Supreme Court would
probably have taken. The Richmond
& Danville R. Co., being a Virginia
corporation and being taxed there on
its rolling stock, leased certain roads
in North and South Carolina and sent
its trains over them. The State of
North Carolina levied a tax upon
rolling stock of the company, which
was constantly passing to and fro
across the State, in the course of in-
terstate commerce. The State Su-
preme Court held that the statutes
imposing taxation had reference only
to property which had a situs in
the State, and that the property in
question had no such situs. The
mere fact that the property of the
company of the value mentioned was
continuously within the State did not
give it a situs there. It was continu-
ally changing and in lransitu in the
course of interstate commerce. "It
is true that such property receives
protection from the State, and has the
benefit of its laws, but nevertheless
it is not the subject of taxation, be-
cause the Constitution of the United
States will not allow it to be made
such subject."
Now we think the last statement
goes farther than the cases warrant.
As we have seen, the cases all admit
that property employed in interstate
commerce is not, on that account,
exempt from taxation as property. If
it were, much of the most valuable
city real estate, namely, most of the
warehouses, offices and stores, would
be exempt. Where taxes h ve been
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declared invalid it was because they
were not property taxes, or were void
for some reason apart from the com-
merce clause of the Constitution.
The cases which establish the immun-
ity of vessels from taxation except in
their home ports depend, as we have
endeavored to show, upon totally dif-
ferent principles.
It is, indeed, only by a considerable
stretch of the imagination, that a
vessel, which merely enters the port
of a State at frequent intervals, can
be considered as in any sense property
within the State. But even if it could
be so considered, the long usage of
maritime nations-recognized by the
laws of the United States, in regard
registry-has established the univer-
sal doctrine that vessels are only tax-
able in their home ports. Now, there
is no such usage or principle in regard
to railroad rolling-stock and, more-
over, its nature and use are funda-
mentally different from the nature and
use of vessels. Vessels are on the
public highway of nations for the
greater portion of the time, and so
entirely beyond the jurisdiction of any
one country, and so, if they are to
have any situs at all, it must be at the
domicile of their owner. Rolling-
stock, on the other hand, though it
may be constantly and continually
moving from place to place, is always
within the jurisdiction of some State,
and subject, to a large extent, to the
laws and regulations thereof. And it
is approximately true of most rolling
stock, and absolutely so of sleeping
cars, that they are not built for use
only within the State of their owner's
domicile, but are expressly intended
for use in other jurisdictions, and may
never return to that in which they are
owned. Their use, and therefore,
their value, also, is distributed over
several jurisdictions, and it would
seem to follow, as a necessary conse-
quence, that that value may be taxed
in each jurisdiction to the extent to
which it actually exists therein, pro-
vided that can be satisfactorily deter-
mined.
It is true that such a doctrine may
not be altogether consistent with the
accepted principles in regard to the
sits of personal property, and its
liability to taxation, but those prin-
ciples were not formed with reference
to problems like the present, and it
is the glory of our system of law that
its rules and principles are capable of
being molded from time to time, to
accommodate the system to changing
conditions and circumstances. Many
such changes have been necessitated
by modern inventions and modes of
life, and by nothing so much as by
the enormous growth and ramifica-
tions of railroads, and the position of
paramount importance which they
have assumed in all departments of
business. In all such cases the con-
servatism of the law must yield to the
superior needs of the public walfare.
As Judge Brewer says, "The most
convenient rule must govern." It
was evidently the obvious conveni-
ence of the rule in question which led
to its adoption by the Court, and it is
difficult to see how a better one could
have been devised, and the opposite
proposition, namely that when cars
are in Pennsylvania every day and in
New York every- night, both States
are deprived of the power to tax them,
is not one which commends itself to
the common sense of a practical age.
Nothing is said, either in the state-
ment of facts or in the opinion, as to
whether the Pullman Company was
taxed upon the entire capital stock at
its domicile. Whether it were or not,
could not have influenced the deci-
sion. If the owner of personal pro-
perty, who pays taxes at his domicile
for such property, as part of his gen-
eral estate attached to his person,
sends it into another jurisdiction, and
is taxed for it there also, this only is
a burden or obligation incident to the
ownership of such property, arising
from the dual position he has as-
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sumed. As a citizen he owes certain
duties and obligations to the States
of his domicile, of the extent of which
his entire property, wherever situ-
ated, may well be taken as a mea-
sure; and as his property in other
States receives protection therefrom,
he may be called upon to pay taxes
therein to the extent of such protec-
tion.
In regard to some of the illustra-
tions used in the dissenting opinion,
we think we are justified in saying
that they are somewhat misleading.
For example, MIr. Justice BRADLEY
says: "Certainly property merely
carried through a State cannot be
taxed by the State. Such a tax
would be a duty, which a State can-
not impose. If a drove of cattle is
driven through Pennsylvania from
Illinois to New York, for the purose
of being sold in New York, whilst in
Pennsylvania, it may be subject to
the police regulations of the State,
but it is not subject to taxation there.
It is not generally subject to the laws
of the State, as other property is. So
if a train of cars starts from Cincin-
nati for New York and passes through
Pennsylvania, it may be subject to
the police regulations of the State
whilst within it, but it would be re-
pugnant to the Constitution of the
United States to tax it. We have de-
cided this very question in the case
of State Freight Tax." 15 Vall. 232,
(1872).
We have italicized the phrase "for
the purpose of being sold in New
York," because it illustrates the
essential difference between the two
illustrations, and destroys any paral-
lel that might otherwise be drawn be-
tween them. No doubt, if the cars
in question in the case were only
being taken across the State, for the
purpose of being sold, they would
have been exempt from taxation.
They would then have been articles
Df commerce, in actual course of
transportation for purposes of inter-
state commerce, and as such exempt
from State taxation, as is established
by a long line of cases. This was
what was decided in the State Freight
Tax Case. As it was, the cars were
in no sense articles of commerce, but
only instrumentalities thereof, the
distinction between which, and the
different principles governing each,
have frequently been pointed out in
the cases. It is certainly a somewhat
novel idea that such cars could be
considered as in any sense imborls,
so that a tax would be a duty.
False analogies and false parallels
have done a great deal to confuse this
subject, and to obscure the fact that
the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion has really nothing to do with the
validity of a tax like the one under
consideration. It is purely and sim-
ply a question of the silus of personal
property; and the decision should be
regarded as having laid down a new
principle in that branch of the law
rather than in that of interstate com-
merce. It is, however, none the less
important on that acconnt.
This case establishing as it does,
the validity of the Pennsylvania law,
will undoubtedly lead to the enact-
ment of similar laws by other State
Legislatures. Should any State over-
step the latitude allowed it, and
attempt to tax the full value of cars
employed in interstate commerce, it
may become necessary for the Su-
preme Court to point out that this
decision does not at all infringe upon
the well established principle, that a
State can only tax persons and prop-
erty within its jurisdiction, and that
the jurisdiction over cars employed
in interstatecommerce, is not an abso-
lute one, but restricted within well
defined limits, which the States are
powerless to transgress. By this it is
not meant to insinuate that the deci-
sion of the Court in this case is a piece
of judicial legislation. In truth it is
not such, but only an illustration of
the fact that in all cases involving the
